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BLOOD-FEUDS, WRITS AND RIFLES*
A REPLY TO PROFESSOR LINDEN
By R. A. HASSON**
A.

INTRODUCTION
Professor Linden's aggressive attack on the Ontario Law Reform Commission's report on automobile accident compensation in the pages of this
journal1 invites a response. It is the purpose of this brief note first, to reply to
some of Professor Linden's comments on the O.L.R.C. proposals and second,
to offer my own criticisms of the O.L.R.C. report.
REPLY TO LINDEN'S CRITICISMS
Criticism 1: The O.L.R.C. did not consult adequately
Unfortunately the O.L.R.C. report is written in such a way as to lend
weight to Linden's criticism that it did not consult a sufficiently wide range
of people in preparing its reports. The Commission must, in the nature of
things, have talked to lawyers and to insurance executives, if to no one else.
A statement to this effect, either 2in the introduction or conclusion of the
report would have been beneficial.
B.
1.

Criticism2: The O.L.R.C. has relied upon stale and inapplicablestatistics
Professor Linden's next criticism is that the O.L.R.C. has relied heavily
upon the Osgoode Hall study for statistical support and that such reliance on
that Report is dangerous because the compensation picture has changed
radically in the last fifteen years.3 Linden might have added that this study
covered only 1,174 cases in the County of York. It might be that if one had
carried out a province-wide survey in 1961, the figures for the province would
be slightly different from the York figures. But no one has made the argument
2.

* "It should be remembered that the tort suit was invented in order to try to assuage the thirst for vengeance in society by furnishing a peaceful substitute to the blood
feud. If the right to sue were eliminated altogether, I would worry about people once

again resorting to private vengeance upon those who do them wrong. In my view, it
is preferable to pursue a wrong-doer with a writ rather than with a rifle." See, infra,
note 1.
** ©Copyright, 1976, R. A. Hasson, The author is a Professor of Law at Osgoode
Hall Law School of York University.
1 See, Faulty No Fault: A Critique of the OntarioLaw Reform Commission Report
on Motor Vehicle Accident Compensation (1975), 13 O.H.L.J. 449, (hereafter referred

to as Linden). I am aware that I am making some of the same points as made by
Professor Bruce Dunlop in his valuable comment, No-Fault Automobile Insurance and
the Negligence Action: An Expensive Anomaly (1975), 13 O.H.L.J. 439, but I believe
that my comment is justified if only because the conclusions I reach are different from
those of Professor Dunlop.
2 Compare the statement in the O.L.R.C.'s report on Consumer Warranties and
Guarantees in the Sale of Goods (1972) at 10: "The research team spent most of the
summer months in 1971 interviewing a wide variety of government officials and
corporate executives."
3
See, Linden, at 452.
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that the York figures are not valid because the position outside York might
reveal a slightly different picture from that revealed by the Osgoode Hall
study. Similarly, the Harris study of the disposition of 90 accident victims in
the City of Oxford in 1965 might intelligently be used to describe the pattern
of accident compensation throughout the United Kingdom. 4 In the Osgoode
Hall study, it was shown that a majority of 57.1 per cent of those injured
received nothing by way of tort recovery. 5 Let us suppose that, as a result of
changes in Legal Aid and the guest passenger law, the number of persons who
now receive nothing from the negligence system has dropped to 46.3 per cent.6
It is a serious indictment of a system whose main aim is allegedly to compensate that it misses out on as many people as those to whom it provides
benefits. Nor can there be any guarantee that the figure will be substantially
reduced in the future. It may well be that, even with changes in the guest
system that does not
passenger law, we will not be able to have a negligence
7
have a 'failure' rate of at least, say, 40 per cent.
The Osgoode Hall study (in common with every other known empirical
study on the subject) shows that those with minor injuries are over-compensated and that those with serious injuries are under-compensated. The
reason for this disparity is clear. In the minor cases, the insurance
company will very often pay out applying rules of thumb which have no
relation to the rules of negligence as applied by our appellate courts. 8 The
minor cases are disposed of by insurance companies so that they can fight
the big cases, this time invoking the negligence rules. The process of disputing
the facts as well as the process of trying to ascertain for-once-and-for-all the
state of the victim's medical condition means delay. This delay generally works
to the advantage of the insurance company and to the disadvantage of the
4

The study is, unfortunately, unpublished. A summary of the main findings of the

survey is to be found in Harris, Analysis of the British Auto Accident Compensation
Scheme published in Comparative Studies in Automobile Accident Compensation (U.S.
Department of Transportation, Automobile Insurance and Compensation Study, 1970).
5 See, Linden, Report of the Osgoode Hall Study on Compensation for Victims of
Automobile Accidents (Toronto: 1965), Chapter IX, at 3. (Hereafter cited as Osgoode
Hall Study.)
0 This figure represents the number of pedestrians who were found by the Osgoode
Hall Study to get nothing from tort sources. (See Osgoode Hall Study, Chapter IX, at 3.)
I have selected the figure for pedestrians because they find it easier to prove negligence
than other categories of auto accident victims. See, The Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O.
1970, c. 202, s. 133, (the reverse onus section).

7 It is significant that in 1961 the failure rate for guest passengers was not much
different from the failure rate for drivers. Thus, while 66.3 per cent of gratuitous
passengers failed to get any negligence compensation, the figure for drivers is 61.2
per cent. (See Osgoode Hall Study, Chapter IX, at 3.)
8 The process is brilliantly described by Professor H. L. Ross in his book, Settled
Out of Court - The Social Process of Insurance Claims Adjustment (Chicago: Aldine
Pub. Co., 1970). To quote only one passage from the book instance the following: "...

if car A strikes car B from the rear, the driver is assumed to be liable and B is not. In
the ordinary course of events, particularly where damages are routine, the adjuster is not
concerned with why A struck B, or with whether A violated a duty of care to B, or
whether A was unreasonable or not. These questions are avoided, not only because they
may be impossible to answer, but also because the fact that A struck B from the rear
will satisfy all supervisory levels that a payment is in order without further explanation."
[at 99. Emphasis in original]
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victim. The victim's need, as has frequently been pointed out, is likely to be
acute and when the technicalities of the law of negligence and the technicalities
of the law of insurance9 threaten total defeat for him, he (or his legal adviser)
is likely to settle for an amount which will, in the course of time, be shown
to be inadequate to cover even economic losses. In short, the O.L.R.C. decided
not to "rediscover the wheer' on the question of negligence. In my view, they
were right not to do so.
3.

Criticism3: The O.L.R.C. did not adequately take into account the many
changes in the law and practice of distributing auto accident losses in
Ontario

Professor Linden criticises the O.L.R.C. for failing to take account of
changes in social welfare legislation, but he shows no understanding in his
article of how social welfare benefits intermesh with tort damages. A person
who is injured in a road accident in Ontario and is unable to work for more
than 15 weeks will have to deal with no less than three bureaucracies in order
to get his benefits. At no point, will the accident victim be able to recover
from a combination of social insurance and motor vehicle insurance benefits
a sum in excess of $205 a week.' 0 Further, the amount will decrease over time.
To illustrate: if we take a single person earning $200 a week in clerical employment, who has lost an arm in a road accident, the progression will be
something like this:
1) For 15 weeks, the victim will get about $203 a week ($133.00 unemployment benefit plus $70 road accident benefits).
2) After 15 weeks the benefits will go down to about $110 a week ($40
welfare benefit" plus $70 road accident benefits).
3) After 104 weeks, the benefits may be reduced further so that the
victim can now only rely on welfare benefit. This will happen because
the victim may be unable to show that he has been "permanently
and totally disabled ...from engaging in any occupation or employ-

ment for which he is reasonably suited by education, training or
experience."' 2
It is impossible to say for certain what welfare benefits the victim will
be getting in two years' time but, even if we assume that he will be getting
welfare benefits of say, $90 a week, it is clear that the legal system is treating
victims brutally.
9 The question of what defences are available to an insurer in a "direct action" proceeding against the insurer under the provincial Insurance Acts is perhaps the most vexed
question in the law of insurance. For attempts to try to bring some order to the chaos,
see, the judgment of the Ontario Court of Appeal in Lepp v. Dominion of Canada
General Insurance (1969), 6 D.L.R. (3d) 365.
10 The exact figure is $203.33 made up of the maximum benefit payable under unemployment benefit (2/3 x $200) = $133.33 + $70 road accident benefits.
1I have computed this figure very generously. My information is that a more
realistic figure would be about $30 a week.
12 See, Schedule E of The Insurance Act, Part II, Total Disability, Section (c),
R.S.O., c. 224, as amended by 1971, c. 84.
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It is no answer to say that such a person should pursue a claim in negligence. Many persons of modest (and more than modest) means will deem
the chances of failure to be too high; they will not wish to run the risk of
incurring a massive bill for legal costs. The fact that many thousands of
accident victims decide not to pursue their negligence claims means that costs
which are attributable to motoring are borne by unemployment insurance
and general welfare funds.' 3 It need hardly be said that these funds are in
no position to subsidize private insurers.
It can be seen from the above that:
1) the compensation provided by social insurance and motor vehicle
accident insurance payments leaves many victims under-compensated;
2) under-compensation becomes more serious with the passage of time
as accident victims are forced to move to lower benefit levels and
after two years are denied no-fault motor vehicle benefits, and
3) social insurance funds, in effect, pay out a massive subsidy to private
insurers.
Professor Linden's other main point in this section is that "the law of
torts has become more humane and readier to grant compensation that is
adequate.' 4 Certainly, anyone reading the law reports in recent months will
have noticed two cases where awards in excess of a million dollars have been
made' 5 and a third case where damages of close to a million dollars were
awarded. 16
On the assumption that these three cases indicate a trend, it is not clear
that this trend is a beneficial one. Professor Fleming has described the process
of fixing damages on a once-for-all basis in these terms: "The short-comings
of the process are lamentable beyond imagination."' 7 The guessing-game
creates serious enough problems when one is awarding damages in, say, the
$5,000 - $50,000 range. To multiply what is already an intolerable margin
of error by a factor of twenty (or more) is something that any rational compensation system cannot condone.
4.

Criticism 4: The O.L.R.C. failed to evaluate the present Ontario no-fault
scheme
As I have shown in the previous section, I do not think the O.L.R.C.

Is This process is carried further by the process of deducting Schedule E benefits
but not social welfare benefits from tort damages: compare, e.g., Boarelli v. Flannigan,
[1973] 3 O.R. 69 (no deduction for unemployment benefit) with Gorrie v. Gill (1975),
59 D.L.R. (3d) 481 (deduction made for Schedule E benefits pursuant to s. 237 of
The InsuranceAct).
14 See, Linden, at 453.
15 Andrews v. Grand & Toy Ltd. (1974), 5 W.W.R. 675 ($1,022,477.48) and
Thornton et al. v. Board of School Trustees of School DistrictNo. 57 (1975), 57 D.L.R.
(3d) 438 ($1,534,058.93).
16
See, Teno v. Arnold (1975), 55 D.L.R. (3d) 57 ($950,000); (1976), 9 O.R.
(2d) 28 ($875,000).
17 See, Fleming, Damages: Capital or Rent? (1969), U. of T. L. J. 295 at 302.
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was wrong in concluding that the present Ontario no-fault scheme provides
inadequate benefits.
5.

Criticism 5: The O.L.R.C. has done no costing studies for its proposal
Professor Linden accuses the O.L.R.C. of not costing its proposal. The
OL.R.C. did attempt to cost its proposal but concluded that it could not
give a dollar and cents figure for the cost of the scheme.' 8 The Commission
rightly said on this point:
Ontario residents spend well over a billion dollars a year owning and operating
motor vehicles. Governments spend three quarters of a billion on roads, streets
and other public works associated with the motor vehicle. In view of these expenditures it is difficult to argue that society cannot afford a no-fault insurance
plan.19

Several other comments must be made about the cost of a no-fault plan.
First, a no-fault plan is easier to cost than one based on negligence; no one
can predict how much awards for damages will be increased in three years'
time. Yet insurance companies have to fix premiums for liabilities which will
come home to roost in three years' time. It is because no-fault is cheaper to
cost that insurance organizations in North America have come to support
no-fault plans over the negligence system 20
Second, the Insurance Bureau of Canada, in its no-fault plan of March
28, 1974, recommended that identical benefits be paid to accident victims,
i.e., wage loss up to $250 per week at least for a period of three years. 21 If a
hard-headed organization such as the I.B.C. is prepared to accept these
liabilities, there is no reason to believe that it is taking on responsibilities
it cannot meet.
Third, the complaint of cost has a strange ring when it comes from someone who believes in the most prodigal system of compensation yet devised, i.e.,
the negligence system, which spends as much on administering the system as
it spends on paying accident victims.2
6.

Criticism 6: The O.L.R.C. is unfair to the innocent and the poor
Professor Linden's next charge is that the O.L.R.C. plan is regressive
and gives compensation to undeserving claimants. I shall deal with the regressive point first. It is true that the O.L.R.C. no-fault (like most genuine
no-fault plans) is, to some extent, regressive. But the important point is that
it is less regressive than the present negligence system. Under the negligence
system both a rich man and a poor man pay the same premium but there is
18 See, Report on Motor Vehicle Accident Compensation (Toronto: Ministry of
the Attorney-General 1973), Chapter XLV (hereafter referred to as O.L.R.C. Report).
19 See, O.L.R.C. Report, Chapter XIV, at 105.
20 For a 'progress' report up to 1968, see King, The Insurance Industry and Compensation Plans (1968), 43 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1137.
21
For a critical discussion of the I.B.C. proposals see the symposium in (1974), 8
Law Society Gazette, at 17-81.
22 See, O.L.R.C. report, Chapter II, at 15 and Chapter VII.
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no limit as to how much the rich person can recover under the negligence
system. Thus, should Elizabeth Taylor, for example, decide to come and live
in Ontario, she would, if injured, be entitled to claim millions of dollars in
damages - at least in the event of serious injury. By way of contrast, the
$1,000 a month ceiling proposed by the O.L.R.C. is comparatively modest
and under the Commission's proposed scheme a rich person would have to
pay more than a person with a modest income to obtain adequate protection
against future loss of income.
Professor Linden is also troubled by the fact that the O.L.R.C. would
give compensation to drinking drivers. The Commission itself would deny
compensation to criminals who are injured while speeding away to avoid
capture. Yet, as Professor Linden has suggested elsewhere, an absolute rule
of this kind is capable of working serious injustice. Undoubtedly, there is a
small number of serious delinquents who should not receive compensation.
The most intelligent way to deal with these cases is to give the relevant adjudicatory body discretion to deny compensation where the injury "is attributable solely to the serious and wilful misconduct"'' of the claimant. To
make victims wait for years and then deny a substantial number of them
compensation altogether because of the existence of a small number of delinquents is more irrational than the classic exercise of attempting to roast
a pig by burning down the house.
7.

Criticism 7: The O.L.R.C. disparagesthe role of lawyers in the resolution
of accident claims
The O.L.R.C. recommended no-fault not because they were prejudiced
against lawyers but because they were concerned that lawyers would be
blamed for faults which are inherent in the negligence system and which are
not of the lawyers' making. Thus, the Osgoode Hall study showed that 22.9
per cent of accident victims were dissatisfied with the treatment provided by
lawyers, whereas only 9.5 per cent were dissatisfied with the quality of their
medical care.- 5 It is probably true that some of the lawyers were incompetent
by any standards, but it is equally likely that many of them were doing their
best in trying to operate a system in which long delays and a substantial
number of failures are inevitable.
Again, Professor Linden's own study shows that the number of people
who are opposed to the negligence system increases with the severity of the
injury suffered. 20 Since it is likely to be the seriously injured who are more
likely to seek out legal advice, some of their dissatisfaction cannot but affect
prejudicially the regard in which lawyers are held. High regard is a precious
.2 3 See, Linden, Tort Law as Ombudsman (1973), 51 C.B.R. 155 at 161, where the
learned writer gives his blessing to the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in
Beim v. Goyer (1966), 57 D.L.R. (2d) 253 where the Court imposed liability on a
policeman who "accidentally" shot an escaping thief.
24
See, s. 3(1) (b) of The Workmen's Compensation Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 503.

25 See, Osgoode Hall Study, Chapter VIII (Attitudes), at 18.
26Id. at2.

1976]

No-Fault Insurance

asset and it ought not to be jeopardised, particularly since "Lawyers can make
2
a decent living without this type of work." r
Professor Linden makes a comparison between the Workmen's Compensation Board and private motor vehicle insurers which cannot go unchallenged. 28 On any standard of comparison, the Workmen's Compensation
Scheme must emerge as a better system than the road accident compensation
scheme. To list some of the advantages of the former:
1) The benefits under The Workmen's CompensationAct are more than
three times as generous as those provided under the road accident scheme. 29
2) A workman who is receiving workmen's compensation benefits and
who is still disabled will continue receiving benefits. Someone who is receiving
road accident benefits will have those benefits cut off after two years unless
he can show that he has been "totally and permanently disabled .. .from

engaging in any employment for which he is reasonably suited by education,
training or experience .... ,,30
3) Some attempt has now been made to increase workmen's compensation benefits so as to make at least some allowance for inflation. 3 ' There is
no similar inflation-proofing for road accident victims.
4) There is no evidence that Workmen's Compensation Board officials
attempt to get accident victims to sign releases for ludicrously low amounts
when they are still recovering from the accident.32 Unhappily, there are instances in the reported casesm of insurance adjusters trying to foist outrageous
final settlements on accident victims who are still recovering from the trauma
of the accident.
5) The Workmen's Compensation Board is financed by levies on employers. The scheme does not rely, as does the Motor Vehicle Accident
Scheme, on massive subsidies from social insurance schemes.
27

See, Linden, at 456.
"Recently, we have seen demonstrations by injured workmen against the Board.
I do not remember seeing any protests by injured auto accident victims," Linden, at 455.
Clearly, the tenor of this passage is that motor vehicle insurers treat their clients better
than the Workmen's Compensation Board treats their claimants.
29
The maximum benefits under The Workmen's Compensation Act at the present
time is $216.36 (75 per cent of $15,000). Schedule E benefits are, of course, $70 a week.
20 Schedule E of The Insurance Act, Part II, Total Disability, section (c), R.S.O.
1970, c. 224 as amended by 1971, c. 84.
31
See, the amendments to The Workmen's Compensation Act made in 1974; see
now, s. 8, S.O. 1974, c. 70 and s. 8(2) and s. 8(b) added by S.O. 1975, c. 47. It should
be noted that the inflation-proofing effected by these changes is very modest.
32 A committee set up in 1970 by the then Minister of Financial and Commercial
Affairs recommended in 1973 that "no release for bodily injury shall be valid or enforceable if signed by the claimant in a hospital or other place where he is receiving medical
treatment." (Recommendation 45(b), at 19.) To the best of my knowledge the report
exists only in mimeograph form.
33
See, Towers v. Affleck, [1974] 1 W.W.R. 714 and Pridmore v. Calvert (1975),
54 D.L.R. (3d) 133.
28
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6) The Workmen's Compensation Board has facilities for rehabilitation,
whereas there are no rehabilitation facilities provided for road accident victims.
Criticism 8: The O.L.R.C. has too limited a view of the functions of
tort law
Professor Linden argues that the law of negligence is concerned with
more than "mere compensation."' 4 He believes that the civil action is necessary as a deterrent against careless and reckless driving. On this point, I can
do no better than to quote the well-known passage in the New York State
Insurance Department Report:
8.

Individual, last-moment driver mistakes - undeterred by fear of death, injury,
imprisonment, fine or loss of licence - surely cannot be deterred by fear of civil
liability against which one is insured. Indeed, as a matter of logic, the contrary
is true. The careless driver is protected by insurance, while his victim can be left
with much of the cost that originally fell upon him. We confront the bizarre con-

clusion that if the fault insurance system is a deterrent to anything,
it is more
5
of a 'deterrent' to becoming a victim than to driving carelessly.X

Second, before we impose civil penalties such as not allowing an offending driver to be indemnified by insurance or else holding the driver liable for
the excess on the limits of his policy, we must make sure that the 'penalty fits
the crime.' If we do not do this, we are in danger of imposing massive 'fines'
on people who are not guilty of any morally reprehensible act. Take, for
example, the case of a man who takes out auto liability insurance coverage
for $100,000. Assume that during the currency of the policy, he changes cars
without notifying the insurer. He then negligently injures someone and is held
liable for $100,000 in damages. It is likely that it will be held that he is not
entitled to be indemnified 3 6 and the insured is now liable to pay the accident
victim $100,000. Surely, it cannot be just to impose a $100,000 fine for what
is, by any standards, a 'trivial' offence?
The argument that negligence actions are necessary to prevent resort to
private vengeance must be considered extravagant nonsense, even allowing for
the use of hyperbole. The fact is that thousands of accident victims are at present
denied compensation and no one anticipates the use of private vengeance. It
is, indeed, strange that when proposals are made to compensate everyone
instead of compensating on a selective basis, arguments about the fear of
shoot-outs should be trotted out.
9.

Criticism 9: The O.L.R.C. wrongly believes that no-fault benefits can
be supplied only if tort law is abolished
Professor Linden believes that the present compromise represents the
best of both worlds and both fault and no-fault regimes can co-exist. The fact
is, however, that no society can, or will ever be able to, afford both negligence
and adequate no-fault benefits. The most generous no-fault plans in a 'mixed'
34 See, Linden, at 457.
5s New York Insurance Department, Automobile Insurance ...For Whose Benefit?
(New York: 1970) at 12.
6
See, the dicta in Bourbonnie v. Union Insurance Society of Canton Ltd. (1959),
22 D.L.R. (2d) 419.
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system pay up to $1,000 a month for three years
(no-fault and negligence)
37
and then pay no more.
38
It is, of course, not true that "pure no-fault has been adopted nowhere.1
New Zealand has had a no-fault scheme in existence for well over two years.3 9
That scheme covers all accidents and it has not been modified despite the
coming to power of a Conservative Government in the last year. As for the
failure of a complete no-fault scheme to be enacted in New York, this is to
be explained not on the merits of the scheme itself, but by the tremendous
political influence of the trial bar.
10. Criticism 10: The O.L.R.C. has failed to consider fully the inter-relation
of auto insurancewith other social welfare schemes
Professor Linden's final argument is that a road accident victim scheme
would treat motor victims differently from, say, malpractice victims. It would,
of course, be a good idea if all accident victims were given no-fault benefits
and it would be an even better idea if accident and sickness victims were to
be treated in the same way. The question is, however, should we reject a good
idea because it does not go far enough?
There would appear to me to be advantages in dealing with road accident
victims separately from other accident victims. In the first place, if there were
a proper no-fault plan for road accident victims, this would mean that the
overwhelming majority of accident victims, i.e., those injured at work and
those injured on the roads would, be getting compensation at a reasonable
level. The benefits provided by the two schemes would be approximately the
for plaintiffs to go 'forum-shopping'
same40 and there would be no incentive
41
as there is, unfortunately, at present.
Second, the advantage of limiting the compensation scheme to road
accident victims means that we can allay the fears of some people and we can
also allow lawyers who have specialized in the personal injury field an opportunity to diversify their work.
Third, there is the danger that if there were a scheme which covered all
accident victims, benefits for those victims would be fixed at a very low level.
The fact is that, although we can project and forecast the number of automobile accidents in the next few years, we have no knowledge of the approximate number of accidents which are neither work-related nor caused by automobile accidents. One of the things we can do while the motor vehicle accident
compensation scheme is operating, is to try to ascertain the approximate
37

The New York and Michigan No-Fault Insurance Plans are briefly described

in the O.L.R.C. report in Chapter HI at 29-30.
38
See, Linden, at 458.
39 The New Zealand Accident Compensation Act 1972, came into force on April 1,

1974. For a survey of the main provisions see Harris, Accident Compensation in New
Zealand: A Comprehensive InsuranceScheme (1974), 37 Mod. L. Rev. 361.
40 The present maximum available under Workmen's Compensation legislation is

$216.36 a week. Road accident victims would get just under $250 a week if the
O.L.R.C.'s proposals were to be implemented.
41
See, e.g., Chu v. Madill (1974), 51 D.L.R. (3d) 481.
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number of such accidents. We can also debate whether compensation for
these accidents should be paid for out of general revenues or whether, for
example, manufacturers should be required to contribute to the compensation
fund for such accidents.
C.

THE DEFECTS OF THE O.L.R.C. PROPOSALS

The O.L.R.C. proposals, although they point in the right directions, have
very grave flaws which require serious consideration. First, for the O.L.R.C.
to write a report on accident compensation in 1974 without seriously considering the question of inflation-proofing the benefits is something that defies
comprehension. At present, four provincial Workmen's Compensation benefit
schemes provide for inflation-proofing and Ontario allows for some limited
inflation-proofing.4 3 Under the Commission's proposals someone who was
seriously injured in 1976 would be getting the same benefits in 1996 or 2006
as he was today. By 1996 accident victims might find they were better off
claiming under the provincial welfare laws than under a no-fault scheme
which was originally set up to provide more generous compensation than the
present welfare benefits!
Second, the O.L.R.C. does not deal with the question of revising
the ceiling on benefits. In a very short time indeed, whatever the success of
anti-inflation programmes, $1,000 a month is going to appear a very modest
amount. Unless provision is made to increase the ceiling say, annually, the
scheme is going to provide very inadequate benefits.
Third, the Commission deals very vaguely with the question of rehabilitation facilities. There is no indication in the Report as to who is to provide
these facilities. Presumably, it is to be the provincial government. But this
does not seem to be fair or feasible. It is not fair because the premium income
from motorists will be going, not to the provincial government, but to private
insurers who will certainly not invest those monies in providing rehabilitation
services. Deprived of this source of income, it is difficult (if not impossible)
to see where the provincial government
will obtain sufficient funds to provide
44
adequate rehabilitation facilities.
In short, as I have argued elsewhere,4 5 I think that an attempt to run a
compensation scheme which provides decent benefits through private insurance
is doomed to failure.
42

The four provinces are: British Columbia, Nova Scotia, Quebec and Saskatchewan. In all these the benefits are indexed to the Consumer Price Index or some
variation thereof.
43
Supra, note 31.
44There are other problems with which the O.L.R.C. does not deal. To mention
only one of these, what happens to the no-fault liabilities incurred by an insurer which
decides that it no longer wishes to carry on business in Ontario or which is unable to
carry on business because of insolvency? Although insurance insolvencies are very rare
in Canada, they are not unknown: see, e.g., A.-G. for Ontario v. Policy-Holders of
Wentworth Insurance Co. (1969), 6 D.L.R. (3d) 545.
45 Hasson and Mesher, No-Fault, Private or Social Insurance? (1975), 4 Industrial
L.L 168.
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CONCLUSION

Professor Linden has arrived at the right conclusion for the wrong
reasons. The O.L.R.C. proposals should not be enacted into legislation as
they now stand. The reason for this has nothing to do with deterrence, fear
of private vengeance and other like phantoms. The reasons for rejecting the
O.L.R.C. proposals as they stand lie in the fact that provision has not been
made for inflation-proofing the benefits, let alone for periodic review of the
awards, nor has any attempt been made to automatically increase the income
ceiling at which no-fault benefits will be provided. Finally, airy and vague
statements about rehabilitation services are of little value, unless it is clear
that monies will be available for the provision of such services. The above
standards seem, to me, to be the absolute minimum for setting up a reasonable
accident compensation scheme. If we waive these minimum standards, we
are in danger of finding that we have travelled a long way only to arrive
back at our point of departure.

